TrackMyHack504

Saturday, February 2, 2013

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SSL linls from my bad cert search 2048 v3

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http://www.openssl.org/related/

http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/openssl.html

Toolkits

These are references to various toolkits and libraries which implement the SSL/TLS protocols and related standards like the X.509 certificate system.OpenSSL http://www.openssl.org/The open-source toolkit for SSL/TLSRSA BSAFE SSL-C http://www.aus.rsa.com/products/sslc/The commercial successor toolkit to SSLeay from RSA DSISSLPlus http://www.consensus.com/sslplus/Another commercial toolkit for SSL/TLS from Certicom/ConsensusSpyrus TLS Gold Toolkit http://www.spyrus.com/content/products/ssl/tlsgold/Another commercial toolkit for SSL/TLS from SpyrusSSLRef ftp://ftp.replay.com/pub/crypto/SSL/Netscape's old SSL reference library from Netscape/Consensus (no longer available)Oscar http://oscar.dstc.qut.edu.au/A public key certification system's toolkitLSM-PKCS11 http://www.clizio.com/lsmpkcs11.htmlA security module accessible as a PKCS#11 library

$ openssl s_client -connect <host>:<port> > foo.cert

Again, lately I've been working on a project that requires the use of SSL and therefore certificates. This is just a note for my own posterity more than anything, but if you ever need to grab a SSL certificate from a host so that you can import it into your keystore, here's how to do so using the OpenSSL s_client:$ openssl s_client -connect <host>:<port> > foo.cert Just make sure to substitute the <host> with the DNS name of the host and the <port> with the actual port number. Once you have the foo.cert file, you will need to manually clean up the foo.cert file a little bit, but it works. Here's a quick example: $ openssl s_client -connect <host>:<port> > foo.cert

http://bsnyderblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/how-to-list-all-certificates-in-jdk.html?m=1

How To List All Certificates in the JDK cacerts File

Lately I've been working on a project that requires the use of SSL and therefore certificates. While working though the necessary tasks, I became curious about the number of certificates that exist in the default truststore in the JDK for Mac OS X (it's named cacerts). Well using Java's keytool utility it's easy to take a peek at them. Here's how to list them:$ echo 'changeit' | keytool -list -v -keystore $(find $JAVA_HOME -name cacerts) | grep 'Owner:' Enter keystore password: Owner: CN=TWCA Root Certification Authority, OU=Root CA, O=TAIWAN-CA, C=TW Owner: OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority, O="VeriSign, Inc.", C=US Owner: CN=NetLock Uzleti (Class B) Tanusitvanykiado, OU=Tanusitvanykiadok, O=NetLock Halozatbiztonsagi Kft., L=Budapest, C=HU Owner: CN=Certum Trusted Network CA, OU=Certum Certification Authority, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., C=PL Owner: CN=Wells Fargo Root Certificate Authority, OU=Wells Fargo Certification Authority, O=Wells Fargo, C=US Owner: CN=Chambers of Commerce Root, OU=http://www.chambersign.org, O=AC Camerfirma SA CIF A82743287, C=EU Owner: CN=Global Chambersign Root, OU=http://www.chambersign.org, O=AC Camerfirma SA CIF A82743287, C=EU Owner: OU=RSA Security 2048 V3, O=RSA Security Inc ... This results in a tremendous amount of output hence the grep to list just the owner. According to this method of listing the certs in the default truststore, there are 183. I just glanced through the list and they seem to come from CAs all over the world. I wonder how it was determined which certs to place in the default truststore?Bruce Snyder at 9:16 AM

No comments:

How To List All Certificates in the JDK cacerts File

Lately I've been working on a project that requires the use of SSL and therefore certificates. While working though the necessary tasks, I became curious about the number of certificates that exist in the default truststore in the JDK for Mac OS X (it's named cacerts). Well using Java's keytool utility it's easy to take a peek at them. Here's how to list them:$ echo 'changeit' | keytool -list -v -keystore $(find $JAVA_HOME -name cacerts) | grep 'Owner:' Enter keystore password: Owner: CN=TWCA Root Certification Authority, OU=Root CA, O=TAIWAN-CA, C=TW Owner: OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority, O="VeriSign, Inc.", C=US Owner: CN=NetLock Uzleti (Class B) Tanusitvanykiado, OU=Tanusitvanykiadok, O=NetLock Halozatbiztonsagi Kft., L=Budapest, C=HU Owner: CN=Certum Trusted Network CA, OU=Certum Certification Authority, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., C=PL Owner: CN=Wells Fargo Root Certificate Authority, OU=Wells Fargo Certification Authority, O=Wells Fargo, C=US Owner: CN=Chambers of Commerce Root, OU=http://www.chambersign.org, O=AC Camerfirma SA CIF A82743287, C=EU Owner: CN=Global Chambersign Root, OU=http://www.chambersign.org, O=AC Camerfirma SA CIF A82743287, C=EU Owner: OU=RSA Security 2048 V3, O=RSA Security Inc ... This results in a tremendous amount of output hence the grep to list just the owner. According to this method of listing the certs in the default truststore, there are 183. I just glanced through the list and they seem to come from CAs all over the world. I wonder how it was determined which certs to place in the default truststore?Bruce Snyder at 9:16 AM

No comments:

How To List All Certificates in the JDK cacerts File

Lately I've been working on a project that requires the use of SSL and therefore certificates. While working though the necessary tasks, I became curious about the number of certificates that exist in the default truststore in the JDK for Mac OS X (it's named cacerts). Well using Java's keytool utility it's easy to take a peek at them. Here's how to list them:$ echo 'changeit' | keytool -list -v -keystore $(find $JAVA_HOME -name cacerts) | grep 'Owner:' Enter keystore password: Owner: CN=TWCA Root Certification Authority, OU=Root CA, O=TAIWAN-CA, C=TW Owner: OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority, O="VeriSign, Inc.", C=US Owner: CN=NetLock Uzleti (Class B) Tanusitvanykiado, OU=Tanusitvanykiadok, O=NetLock Halozatbiztonsagi Kft., L=Budapest, C=HU Owner: CN=Certum Trusted Network CA, OU=Certum Certification Authority, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., C=PL Owner: CN=Wells Fargo Root Certificate Authority, OU=Wells Fargo Certification Authority, O=Wells Fargo, C=US Owner: CN=Chambers of Commerce Root, OU=http://www.chambersign.org, O=AC Camerfirma SA CIF A82743287, C=EU Owner: CN=Global Chambersign Root, OU=http://www.chambersign.org, O=AC Camerfirma SA CIF A82743287, C=EU Owner: OU=RSA Security 2048 V3, O=RSA Security Inc ... This results in a tremendous amount of output hence the grep to list just the owner. According to this method of listing the certs in the default truststore, there are 183. I just glanced through the list and they seem to come from CAs all over the world. I wonder how it was determined which certs to place in the default truststore?Bruce Snyder at 9:16 AM

No comments:

How To List All Certificates in the JDK cacerts File

Lately I've been working on a project that requires the use of SSL and therefore certificates. While working though the necessary tasks, I became curious about the number of certificates that exist in the default truststore in the JDK for Mac OS X (it's named cacerts). Well using Java's keytool utility it's easy to take a peek at them. Here's how to list them:$ echo 'changeit' | keytool -list -v -keystore $(find $JAVA_HOME -name cacerts) | grep 'Owner:' Enter keystore password: Owner: CN=TWCA Root Certification Authority, OU=Root CA, O=TAIWAN-CA, C=TW Owner: OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority, O="VeriSign, Inc.", C=US Owner: CN=NetLock Uzleti (Class B) Tanusitvanykiado, OU=Tanusitvanykiadok, O=NetLock Halozatbiztonsagi Kft., L=Budapest, C=HU Owner: CN=Certum Trusted Network CA, OU=Certum Certification Authority, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., C=PL Owner: CN=Wells Fargo Root Certificate Authority, OU=Wells Fargo Certification Authority, O=Wells Fargo, C=US Owner: CN=Chambers of Commerce Root, OU=http://www.chambersign.org, O=AC Camerfirma SA CIF A82743287, C=EU Owner: CN=Global Chambersign Root, OU=http://www.chambersign.org, O=AC Camerfirma SA CIF A82743287, C=EU Owner: OU=RSA Security 2048 V3, O=RSA Security Inc ... This results in a tremendous amount of output hence the grep to list just the owner. According to this method of listing the certs in the default truststore, there are 183. I just glanced through the list and they seem to come from CAs all over the world. I wonder how it was determined which certs to place in the default truststore?Bruce Snyder at 9:16 AM

No comments:

removed from NSS.OU = RSA Security 1024 V3O = RSA Security IncValid From: 2/22/01Valid To: 2/22/26SHA1 Fingerprint: 3C:BB:5D:E0:FC:D6:39:7C:05:88:E5:66:97:BD:46:2A:BD:F9:5C:76I have not been able to find the current owner of this root. Both RSA and VeriSign have stated in email that they do not own this root.Therefore, to my knowledge this root has no current owner and no current audit, and should be removed from NSS.I have also filed a bug for this:https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=549701I am now opening this proposal up to public discussion. Please respond to this discussion if you have any knowledge of this root that would help in making this decision.By the way, To see the complete list of all of the root certificate authorities that are included in NSS, and who currently owns/operates them, go to http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/ and click on the "List of all included root certificates" link. This will display the public and published version of a spreadsheet that I maintain. There is a column called "Company Website" which indicates the current owner of each root.KathleenReply4/2/10Gen KanaiOn 4/3/10 2:19 AM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:> I have not been able to find the current owner of this root. Both RSA > and VeriSign have stated in email that they do not own this root.>> Therefore, to my knowledge this root has no current owner and no current > audit, and should be removed from NSS.> I concur.Separately, do we know how a root with such a name (if RSA was not the owner) was installed?-- Gen KanaiReply4/3/10Nelson BolyardOn 2010-04-02 10:19 PST, Kathleen Wilson wrote:> All,> > I propose that the "RSA Security 1024 V3" root certificate authority be > removed from NSS.> > OU = RSA Security 1024 V3> O = RSA Security Inc> Valid From: 2/22/01> Valid To: 2/22/26> SHA1 Fingerprint: > 3C:BB:5D:E0:FC:D6:39:7C:05:88:E5:66:97:BD:46:2A:BD:F9:5C:76> > I have not been able to find the current owner of this root. Both RSA > and VeriSign have stated in email that they do not own this root.> > Therefore, to my knowledge this root has no current owner and no current > audit, and should be removed from NSS.Who owns the cert named "RSA Security 2048 V3"?It was put into nssckbi at the same time as the 1024 v3 cert.Is that one also owned by nobody?If so, let's nuke 'em both together.Reply4/3/10Nelson Bolyard- show quoted text -See bugzilla bug 139874Reply4/3/10Florian Weimer* Gen Kanai:> Separately, do we know how a root with such a name (if RSA was not> the owner) was installed?They do not own it now, but the company likely created it.For instance, the Equifax root isn't controlled by Equifax anymore,and there a couple of such examples. There was a time when roots weretraded heavily.Reply4/5/10Gervase MarkhamOn 02/04/10 18:19, Kathleen Wilson wrote:> I have not been able to find the current owner of this root. Both RSA> and VeriSign have stated in email that they do not own this root.That's rather worrying. Do we know for certain that one or other created it originally? Do we know if it's in any other root stores other than our own?The lack of transparency in 2002 re: the source of added roots means we have no idea whether e.g. some malicious actor slipped an extra one into whatever list they were keeping internally to Netscape, and has been MITMing people ever since.GervReply4/5/10Kathleen WilsonOn 4/5/10 11:28 AM, Gervase Markham wrote:> On 02/04/10 18:19, Kathleen Wilson wrote:>> I have not been able to find the current owner of this root. Both RSA>> and VeriSign have stated in email that they do not own this root.>> That's rather worrying. Do we know for certain that one or other created> it originally?Both "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" have the same validity dates of 2001 Feb 22 to 2026 Feb 22. I believe that both of these roots were created by RSA. I have not been able to ascertain from RSA whether the "RSA Security 1024 V3" root has been simply retired by RSA versus transferred to another company via M&A activity.The "RSA Security 2048 V3" root is covered under RSA's current audit statement: https://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=981&file=pdf> Do we know if it's in any other root stores other than> our own?Both "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" are shown as valid in Apple's System Roots.Microsoft's list includes "RSA Security 2048 V3", but not "RSA Security 1024 V3".KathleenReply4/5/10wwa...@gmx.deOn Apr 5, 2:53 pm, Kathleen Wilson <kathleen95...@yahoo.com> wrote:> Both "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" have the same> validity dates of 2001 Feb 22 to 2026 Feb 22. I believe that both of> these roots were created by RSA.The same validity range is not a proof of any kind. It should reallybechecked if this CA was created by RSA or - which i do hope not - isa rogue one by someone who just set the same date range in hiscertificate and then somehow got it included.This could be a utter security desaster. Lets hope it isn't.Reply4/6/10Gervase MarkhamOn 05/04/10 19:53, Kathleen Wilson wrote:> Both "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" have the same> validity dates of 2001 Feb 22 to 2026 Feb 22. I believe that both of> these roots were created by RSA.Do you believe that based solely on the validity dates?If I had access to the machine of a Netscape NSS developer who was about to update the root store, and I wanted to slip in a cert I had the private key for, I'd add another entry to the store which was very similar to an existing one but with one obvious difference, so that people would assume they were a set.Perhaps this is far-fetched and paranoid. But the fact that RSA know nothing whatsoever about this root is rather concerning.> Both "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" are shown as> valid in Apple's System Roots.Hmm. Do we have contacts at Apple who we can ask to see if they have documentation on the provenance of this root?GervReply4/6/10RonnyGoogle accepts "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" fortheir Checkout API authentication too.see http://checkout.google.com/support/sell/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=57856According to bonsai, the certificate was installed in version 1.17(http://bonsai.mozilla.org/cvsview2.cgi?diff_mode=context&whitespace_mode=show&subdir=mozilla/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins&command=DIFF_FRAMESET&file=certdata.txt&rev1=1.16&rev2=1.17&root=/cvsroot) by Julien Pierre as part of bug #139874 (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=139874).Reply4/6/10vortexOn Apr 6, 1:14 pm, Ronny <ronny.peri...@gmail.com> wrote:> Google accepts "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" for> their Checkout API authentication too.>> seehttp://checkout.google.com/support/sell/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=57856>> According to bonsai, the certificate was installed in version 1.17> (http://bonsai.mozilla.org/cvsview2.cgi?> diff_mode=context&whitespace_mode=show&subdir=mozilla/security/nss/lib/> ckfw/> builtins&command=DIFF_FRAMESET&file=certdata.txt&rev1=1.16&rev2=1.17&root=/> cvsroot) by Julien Pierre as part of bug #139874 (https://> bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=139874).Did anyone check with Valicert? Apparently this very issue came up in2006 in Debian world.http://groups.google.com/group/linux.debian.bugs.dist/browse_thread/thread/5b33fa29d3d83c66/5a6fe5ca3e2da747?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&q=%22RSA+Security+1024+V3%22#5a6fe5ca3e2da747Reply4/6/10wwa...@gmx.deOn Apr 6, 8:34 pm, vortex <rafael.riv...@gmail.com> wrote:> Did anyone check with Valicert? Apparently this very issue came up in> 2006 in Debian world.http://groups.google.com/group/linux.debian.bugs.dist/browse_thread/t...You should better reread that message. Valicert has nothing to do withthis. The "RSA Security 1024 V3" CA was only shown as an example of aCA by RSA in that
https://groups.google.com/forum/m/?fromgroups#!topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/tkk6KFunmZg

CA Certificate in my phone banned years ago

https://groups.google.com/forum/m/?fromgroups#!topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/tkk6KFunmZg

removed from NSS.OU = RSA Security 1024 V3O = RSA Security IncValid From: 2/22/01Valid To: 2/22/26SHA1 Fingerprint: 3C:BB:5D:E0:FC:D6:39:7C:05:88:E5:66:97:BD:46:2A:BD:F9:5C:76I have not been able to find the current owner of this root. Both RSA and VeriSign have stated in email that they do not own this root.Therefore, to my knowledge this root has no current owner and no current audit, and should be removed from NSS.I have also filed a bug for this:https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=549701I am now opening this proposal up to public discussion. Please respond to this discussion if you have any knowledge of this root that would help in making this decision.By the way, To see the complete list of all of the root certificate authorities that are included in NSS, and who currently owns/operates them, go to http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/ and click on the "List of all included root certificates" link. This will display the public and published version of a spreadsheet that I maintain. There is a column called "Company Website" which indicates the current owner of each root.KathleenReply4/2/10Gen KanaiOn 4/3/10 2:19 AM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:> I have not been able to find the current owner of this root. Both RSA > and VeriSign have stated in email that they do not own this root.>> Therefore, to my knowledge this root has no current owner and no current > audit, and should be removed from NSS.> I concur.Separately, do we know how a root with such a name (if RSA was not the owner) was installed?-- Gen KanaiReply4/3/10Nelson BolyardOn 2010-04-02 10:19 PST, Kathleen Wilson wrote:> All,> > I propose that the "RSA Security 1024 V3" root certificate authority be > removed from NSS.> > OU = RSA Security 1024 V3> O = RSA Security Inc> Valid From: 2/22/01> Valid To: 2/22/26> SHA1 Fingerprint: > 3C:BB:5D:E0:FC:D6:39:7C:05:88:E5:66:97:BD:46:2A:BD:F9:5C:76> > I have not been able to find the current owner of this root. Both RSA > and VeriSign have stated in email that they do not own this root.> > Therefore, to my knowledge this root has no current owner and no current > audit, and should be removed from NSS.Who owns the cert named "RSA Security 2048 V3"?It was put into nssckbi at the same time as the 1024 v3 cert.Is that one also owned by nobody?If so, let's nuke 'em both together.Reply4/3/10Nelson Bolyard- show quoted text -See bugzilla bug 139874Reply4/3/10Florian Weimer* Gen Kanai:> Separately, do we know how a root with such a name (if RSA was not> the owner) was installed?They do not own it now, but the company likely created it.For instance, the Equifax root isn't controlled by Equifax anymore,and there a couple of such examples. There was a time when roots weretraded heavily.Reply4/5/10Gervase MarkhamOn 02/04/10 18:19, Kathleen Wilson wrote:> I have not been able to find the current owner of this root. Both RSA> and VeriSign have stated in email that they do not own this root.That's rather worrying. Do we know for certain that one or other created it originally? Do we know if it's in any other root stores other than our own?The lack of transparency in 2002 re: the source of added roots means we have no idea whether e.g. some malicious actor slipped an extra one into whatever list they were keeping internally to Netscape, and has been MITMing people ever since.GervReply4/5/10Kathleen WilsonOn 4/5/10 11:28 AM, Gervase Markham wrote:> On 02/04/10 18:19, Kathleen Wilson wrote:>> I have not been able to find the current owner of this root. Both RSA>> and VeriSign have stated in email that they do not own this root.>> That's rather worrying. Do we know for certain that one or other created> it originally?Both "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" have the same validity dates of 2001 Feb 22 to 2026 Feb 22. I believe that both of these roots were created by RSA. I have not been able to ascertain from RSA whether the "RSA Security 1024 V3" root has been simply retired by RSA versus transferred to another company via M&A activity.The "RSA Security 2048 V3" root is covered under RSA's current audit statement: https://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=981&file=pdf> Do we know if it's in any other root stores other than> our own?Both "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" are shown as valid in Apple's System Roots.Microsoft's list includes "RSA Security 2048 V3", but not "RSA Security 1024 V3".KathleenReply4/5/10wwa...@gmx.deOn Apr 5, 2:53 pm, Kathleen Wilson <kathleen95...@yahoo.com> wrote:> Both "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" have the same> validity dates of 2001 Feb 22 to 2026 Feb 22. I believe that both of> these roots were created by RSA.The same validity range is not a proof of any kind. It should reallybechecked if this CA was created by RSA or - which i do hope not - isa rogue one by someone who just set the same date range in hiscertificate and then somehow got it included.This could be a utter security desaster. Lets hope it isn't.Reply4/6/10Gervase MarkhamOn 05/04/10 19:53, Kathleen Wilson wrote:> Both "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" have the same> validity dates of 2001 Feb 22 to 2026 Feb 22. I believe that both of> these roots were created by RSA.Do you believe that based solely on the validity dates?If I had access to the machine of a Netscape NSS developer who was about to update the root store, and I wanted to slip in a cert I had the private key for, I'd add another entry to the store which was very similar to an existing one but with one obvious difference, so that people would assume they were a set.Perhaps this is far-fetched and paranoid. But the fact that RSA know nothing whatsoever about this root is rather concerning.> Both "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" are shown as> valid in Apple's System Roots.Hmm. Do we have contacts at Apple who we can ask to see if they have documentation on the provenance of this root?GervReply4/6/10RonnyGoogle accepts "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" fortheir Checkout API authentication too.see http://checkout.google.com/support/sell/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=57856According to bonsai, the certificate was installed in version 1.17(http://bonsai.mozilla.org/cvsview2.cgi?diff_mode=context&whitespace_mode=show&subdir=mozilla/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins&command=DIFF_FRAMESET&file=certdata.txt&rev1=1.16&rev2=1.17&root=/cvsroot) by Julien Pierre as part of bug #139874 (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=139874).Reply4/6/10vortexOn Apr 6, 1:14 pm, Ronny <ronny.peri...@gmail.com> wrote:> Google accepts "RSA Security 1024 V3" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" for> their Checkout API authentication too.>> seehttp://checkout.google.com/support/sell/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=57856>> According to bonsai, the certificate was installed in version 1.17> (http://bonsai.mozilla.org/cvsview2.cgi?> diff_mode=context&whitespace_mode=show&subdir=mozilla/security/nss/lib/> ckfw/> builtins&command=DIFF_FRAMESET&file=certdata.txt&rev1=1.16&rev2=1.17&root=/> cvsroot) by Julien Pierre as part of bug #139874 (https://> bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=139874).Did anyone check with Valicert? Apparently this very issue came up in2006 in Debian world.http://groups.google.com/group/linux.debian.bugs.dist/browse_thread/thread/5b33fa29d3d83c66/5a6fe5ca3e2da747?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&q=%22RSA+Security+1024+V3%22#5a6fe5ca3e2da747Reply4/6/10wwa...@gmx.deOn Apr 6, 8:34 pm, vortex <rafael.riv...@gmail.com> wrote:> Did anyone check with Valicert? Apparently this very issue came up in> 2006 in Debian world.http://groups.google.com/group/linux.debian.bugs.dist/browse_thread/t...You should better reread that message. Valicert has nothing to do withthis. The "RSA Security 1024 V3" CA was only shown as an example of aCA by RSA in that

Bluetooth Site and services /programs on my phone

Lots of codes / unique process names listes here are within
previous lpg cats from my phone. Esp OBEX.

Qualcom is part of the pre boot program referenced in
the system notes of my phone.

The Kirkland WA address is among the IP Geo traces
in my log posts.

NOTE Test progams in pages
-----

https://qualweb.bluetooth.org/apps/content/

https://qualweb.bluetooth.org/apps/content/

https://qualweb.bluetooth.org/Technical/AssignedNumbers/service_discovery.htm

https://qualweb.bluetooth.org/Technical/AssignedNumbers/service_discovery.htm

https://qualweb.bluetooth.org/Technical/AssignedNumbers/service_discovery.htm

IpSubnet (Not used in PAN v1.0)0x0200SecurityDescription0x030ANetAccessType0x030BMaxNetAccessrate0x030CIPv4Subnet0x030DIPv6Subnet/td>0x030E Phone Book Access Profile Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:Phonebook Access - PCE: 0x112EPhonebook Access - PSE: 0x112FAttribute NameAttribute IDSupportedRepositories0x0314 Synchronization Profile Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:IrMCSync: 0x1104Attribute NameAttribute IDSupported Data Stores List0x0301 Attribute ID Offsets for Strings The following table contains Attribute ID Offsets which are added to the value contained in the LanguageBaseAttributeIDList attribute. Attribute ID Offset NameAttribute ID OffsetReferenceServiceName0x0000Bluetooth Core SpecificationServiceDescription0x0001Bluetooth Core SpecificationProviderName0x0002Bluetooth Core Specification (Max value 0xFFFF) Table 5: Attribute Identifiers The base offset as given by the LanguageBaseAttributeIDList attribute must be added to each ID value in this table. For the primary language, this shall be equal to 0x0100 as described in the SDP specification. Protocol Parameters ProtocolParameter NameParameter IndexL2CAPPSM1RFCOMMChannel1TCPPort1UDPPort1BNEPVersion1BNEPSupported Network Packet Type List2Table 6: Protocol Parameters

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Service Discovery

Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) short formsThe Bluetooth Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) specification defines a way to represent a range of UUIDs (which are nominally 128-bits) in a shorter form. A reserved range of 232 values can be represented using 32-bits (denoted uuid32). Of these, a sub-range of 216 values can be represented using only 16 -bits (denoted uuid16). All values in the 232 range that are not assigned in this document are reserved pending future revisions of this document. In other words, no value in this range may be used except as specified in this or future revisions of this document. UUID values outside of this range can be allocated as described in [ISO-11578] for any purpose the allocater desires.Base Universally Unique Identifier (UUID)The Base UUID is used for calculating 128-bit UUIDs from 'short UUIDs' (uuid16 and uuid32) as described in the SDP Specification. See Service Discovery Protocol (SDP), in the Bluetooth Core Specification.NOTE: Currently all assigned short UUIDs are uuid16 types.UUID NameUUIDBASE_UUID00000000-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FBProtocol IdentifiersThe UUIDs in the following table shall only be used in the ProfileDescriptorList attribute.Protocol NameUUIDProtocol SpecificationSDP0x0001Bluetooth Core SpecificationUDP0x0002[NO USE BY PROFILES]RFCOMM0x0003RFCOMM with TS 07.10TCP0x0004[NO USE BY PROFILES]TCS-BIN0x0005Telephony Control Specification / TCS Binary [DEPRECATED]TCS-AT0x0006[NO USE BY PROFILES]ATT0x0007Attribute ProtocolOBEX0x0008IrDA InteroperabilityIP0x0009[NO USE BY PROFILES]FTP0x000A[NO USE BY PROFILES]HTTP0x000C[NO USE BY PROFILES]WSP0x000E[NO USE BY PROFILES]BNEP0x000FBluetooth Network Encapsulation Protocol (BNEP)UPNP0x0010Extended Service Discovery Profile (ESDP) [DEPRECATED]HIDP0x0011Human Interface Device Profile (HID)HardcopyControlChannel0x0012Hardcopy Cable Replacement Profile (HCRP)HardcopyDataChannel0x0014See Hardcopy Cable Replacement Profile (HCRP)HardcopyNotification0x0016Hardcopy Cable Replacement Profile (HCRP)AVCTP0x0017Audio/Video Control Transport Protocol (AVCTP)AVDTP0x0019Audio/Video Distribution Transport Protocol (AVDTP)CMTP0x001BCommon ISDN Access Profile (CIP) [DEPRECATED]MCAPControlChannel0x001EMulti-Channel Adaptation Protocol (MCAP)MCAPDataChannel0x001FMulti-Channel Adaptation Protocol (MCAP)L2CAP0x0100Bluetooth Core Specification (Max value 0xFFFF) Table 1: Protocol Identifiers and Names Service classes and Profile IdentifiersUUIDs in the following table which have an allowed usage of Service Class may be used in the ServiceClassIDList universal attribute, but shall not be used in the BluetoothProfileDescriptorList attribute unless the Profile usage is also allowed per the table below. If a Service Class UUID is exposed in the SDP database of a product, then the product containing the SDP record shall comply with the specification which defines the service corresponding to the UUID.UUIDs in the following table which have an allowed usage of Profile may be used in the BluetoothProfileDescriptorList universal attribute, but shall not be used in the ServiceClassIDList universal attribute unless the Service Class usage is also allowed per the table below.For historical reasons, some UUIDs in Table 2 are used to identify profiles in a BluetoothProfileDescriptorList universal attribute as well as service classes in a ServiceClassIDList universal attribute. However, for new profiles, Service Class UUIDs shall not be used in a BluetoothProfileDescriptorList universal attribute and Profile UUIDs shall not be used in a ServiceClassIDList universal attribute.Service Class NameUUIDSpecificationAllowed UsageServiceDiscoveryServerServiceClassID0x1000Bluetooth Core SpecificationService ClassBrowseGroupDescriptorServiceClassID0x1001Bluetooth Core SpecificationService ClassSerialPort0x1101Serial Port Profile (SPP)NOTE: The example SDP record in SPP v1.0 does not include a BluetoothProfileDescriptorList attribute, but some implementations may also use this UUID for the Profile Identifier.Service Class/ ProfileLANAccessUsingPPP0x1102LAN Access Profile[DEPRECATED]NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.Service Class/ ProfileDialupNetworking0x1103Dial-up Networking Profile (DUN)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.Service Class/ ProfileIrMCSync0x1104Synchronization Profile (SYNC)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.Service Class/ ProfileOBEXObjectPush0x1105Object Push Profile (OPP)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile.Service Class/ ProfileOBEXFileTransfer0x1106File Transfer Profile (FTP)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.Service Class/ ProfileIrMCSyncCommand0x1107Synchronization Profile (SYNC) Headset0x1108Headset Profile (HSP)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.Service Class/ ProfileCordlessTelephony0x1109Cordless Telephony Profile (CTP)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.[DEPRECATED]Service Class/ ProfileAudioSource0x110AAdvanced Audio Distribution Profile (A2DP)Service ClassAudioSink0x110BAdvanced Audio Distribution Profile (A2DP)Service ClassA/V_RemoteControlTarget0x110CAudio/Video Remote Control Profile (AVRCP)Service ClassAdvancedAudioDistribution0x110DAdvanced Audio Distribution Profile (A2DP)ProfileA/V_RemoteControl0x110EAudio/Video Remote Control Profile (AVRCP)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.Service Class/ ProfileA/V_RemoteControlController0x110FAudio/Video Remote Control Profile (AVRCP)NOTE: The AVRCP specification v1.3 and later require that 0x110E also be included in the ServiceClassIDList before 0x110F for backwards compatibility.Service ClassIntercom0x1110Intercom Profile (ICP)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.[DEPRECATED]Service ClassFax0x1111Fax Profile (FAX)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.[DEPRECATED]Service ClassHeadset - Audio Gateway (AG)0x1112Headset Profile (HSP)Service ClassWAP0x1113Interoperability Requirements for Bluetooth technology as a WAP, Bluetooth SIG [DEPRECATED]Service ClassWAP_CLIENT0x1114Interoperability Requirements for Bluetooth technology as a WAP, Bluetooth SIG [DEPRECATED]Service ClassPANU0x1115Personal Area Networking Profile (PAN)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier for PANU role.Service Class / ProfileNAP0x1116Personal Area Networking Profile (PAN)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier for NAP role.Service Class / ProfileGN0x1117Personal Area Networking Profile (PAN)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier for GN role.Service Class / ProfileDirectPrinting0x1118Basic Printing Profile (BPP)Service ClassReferencePrinting0x1119See Basic Printing Profile (BPP)Service ClassBasic Imaging Profile0x111ABasic Imaging Profile (BIP)ProfileImagingResponder0x111BBasic Imaging Profile (BIP)Service ClassImagingAutomaticArchive0x111CBasic Imaging Profile (BIP)Service ClassImagingReferencedObjects0x111DBasic Imaging Profile (BIP)Service ClassHandsfree0x111EHands-Free Profile (HFP)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.Service Class / ProfileHandsfreeAudioGateway0x111FHands-free Profile (HFP)Service ClassDirectPrintingReferenceObjectsService0x1120Basic Printing Profile (BPP)Service ClassReflectedUI0x1121Basic Printing Profile (BPP)Service ClassBasicPrinting0x1122Basic Printing Profile (BPP)ProfilePrintingStatus0x1123Basic Printing Profile (BPP)Service ClassHumanInterfaceDeviceService0x1124Human Interface Device (HID)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.Service Class / ProfileHardcopyCableReplacement0x1125Hardcopy Cable Replacement Profile (HCRP)ProfileHCR_Print0x1126Hardcopy Cable Replacement Profile (HCRP)Service ClassHCR_Scan0x1127Hardcopy Cable Replacement Profile (HCRP)Service ClassCommon_ISDN_Access0x1128Common ISDN Access Profile (CIP)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.[DEPRECATED]Service Class / ProfileSIM_Access0x112DSIM Access Profile (SAP)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.Service Class / ProfilePhonebook Access - PCE0x112EPhonebook Access Profile (PBAP)Service ClassPhonebook Access - PSE0x112FPhonebook Access Profile (PBAP)Service ClassPhonebook Access0x1130Phonebook Access Profile (PBAP)ProfileHeadset - HS0x1131Headset Profile (HSP)NOTE: See erratum #3507.0x1108 and 0x1203 should also be included in the ServiceClassIDList before 0x1131 for backwards compatibility.Service ClassMessage Access Server0x1132Message Access Profile (MAP)Service ClassMessage Notification Server0x1133Message Access Profile (MAP)Service ClassMessage Access Profile0x1134Message Access Profile (MAP)ProfileGNSS0x1135Global Navigation Satellite System Profile (GNSS)ProfileGNSS_Server0x1136Global Navigation Satellite System Profile (GNSS)Service ClassPnPInformation0x1200Device Identification (DID)NOTE: Used as both Service Class Identifier and Profile Identifier.Service Class / ProfileGenericNetworking0x1201N/AService ClassGenericFileTransfer0x1202N/AService ClassGenericAudio0x1203N/AService ClassGenericTelephony0x1204N/AService ClassUPNP_Service0x1205Enhanced Service Discovery Profile (ESDP) [DEPRECATED]Service ClassUPNP_IP_Service0x1206Enhanced Service Discovery Profile (ESDP) [DEPRECATED]Service ClassESDP_UPNP_IP_PAN0x1300Enhanced Service Discovery Profile (ESDP) [DEPRECATED]Service ClassESDP_UPNP_IP_LAP0x1301Enhanced Service Discovery Profile (ESDP)[DEPRECATED]Service ClassESDP_UPNP_L2CAP0x1302Enhanced Service Discovery Profile (ESDP)[DEPRECATED]Service ClassVideoSource0x1303Video Distribution Profile (VDP)Service ClassVideoSink0x1304Video Distribution Profile (VDP)Service ClassVideoDistribution0x1305Video Distribution Profile (VDP)Service ClassHDP0x1400Health Device ProfileProfileHDP Source0x1401Health Device Profile (HDP)Service ClassHDP Sink0x1402Health Device Profile (HDP)Service Class (Max value 0xFFFF) Table 2: Service Class profile Identifiers Browse Group Identifiers The UUIDs in the following table may only be used in BrowseGroupList attribute. UUID NameUUIDSpecificationPublicBrowseRoot0x1002Bluetooth Core Specification (Max value 0xFFFF) Table 3: Browse Group Identifiers and Names Attribute Identifiers Advanced Audio Distribution Profile (A2DP) Applicable to Service Class UUIDs: AudioSource: 0x110AAudioSink: 0x110B Attribute NameAttribute IDSupportedFeatures0x0311 Audio/Video Remote Control Profile (AVRCP) Applicable to Service Class UUIDs: A/V_RemoteControlTarget: 0x110CA/V_RemoteControl: 0x110EA/V_RemoteControlController: 0x110F Attribute NameAttribute IDSupportedFeatures0x0311 Basic Imaging Profile (BIP) Applicable to Service Class UUIDs: ImagingResponder: 0x111BImagingAutomaticArchive: 0x111CImagingReferencedObjects: 0x111D Attribute NameAttribute IDGoepL2capPsm (BIP v1.1 and later)0x0200SupportedCapabilities0x0310SupportedFeatures0x0311SupportedFunctions0x0312TotalImagingDataCapacity0x0313 Basic Printing Profile (BPP) Applicable to Service Class UUIDs: Direct Printing: 0x1118ReferencePrinting: 0x1119DirectPrintingReferenceObjectsService: 0x1120ReflectedUI: 0x1121PrintingStatus: 0x1123 Attribute NameAttribute IDDocument Formats Supported0x0350Character Repertoires Supported0x0352XHTML-Print Image Formats Supported0x0354Color Supported0x03561284ID0x0358Printer Name0x035APrinter Location0x035CDuplex Supported0x035EMedia Types Supported0x0360MaxMediaWidth0x0362MaxMediaLength0x0364Enhanced Layout Supported0x0366RUI Formats Supported0x0368Reference Printing RUI Supported0x0370Direct Printing RUI Supported0x0372Reference Printing Top URL0x0374Direct Printing Top URL0x0376Printer Admin RUI Top URL0x0378Device Name0x037A Bluetooth Core Specification: Universal Attributes The following attribute IDs have the same meaning for all services. These attribute IDs shall be in the range from 0x0000 to 0x01FF. Attribute NameAttribute IDServiceRecordHandle0x0000ServiceClassIDList0x0001ServiceRecordState0x0002ServiceID0x0003ProtocolDescriptorList0x0004BrowseGroupList0x0005LanguageBaseAttributeIDList0x0006ServiceInfoTimeToLive0x0007ServiceAvailability0x0008BluetoothProfileDescriptorList0x0009DocumentationURL0x000AClientExecutableURL0x000BIconURL0x000CAdditionalProtocolDescriptorLists0x000DReserved0x000E – 0x01FF Bluetooth Core Specification: Service Discovery Service Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:ServiceDiscoveryServerServiceClassID: 0x1000Attribute NameAttribute IDVersionNumberList0x0200ServiceDatabaseState0x0201 Bluetooth Core Specification: Browse Group Descriptor Service Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:BrowseGroupDescriptorServiceClassID: 0x1001Attribute NameAttribute IDGroupID0x0200 Cordless Telephony Profile [DEPRECATED] Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:CordlessTelephony: 0x1001Attribute NameAttribute IDExternal network0x0301 Device Identification Profile Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:PnPInformation: 0x1200Attribute NameAttribute IDSpecificationID0x0200VendorID0x0201ProductID0x0202Version0x0203PrimaryRecord0x0204VendorIDSource0x0205 Fax Profile [DEPRECATED] Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:Fax: 0x1111Attribute NameAttribute IDFax Class 1 Support0x0302Fax Class 2.0 Support0x0303Fax Class 2 Support(vendor-specific class)0x0304Audio Feedback Support0x0305 File Transfer Profile Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:OBEXFileTransfer: 0x1109Attribute NameAttribute IDGoepL2capPsm(FTP v1.2 and later)0x0200 Generic Object Exchange Profile Attribute NameAttribute IDGoepL2capPsm(GOEP v2.0 and later)Must be defined separately for each GOEP-based service. Global Navigation Satellite System Profile (GNSS) Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:GNSS Service: 0x1136 Attribute NameAttribute IDSupportedFeatures0x0200 Hands-Free Profile Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:Handsfree: 0x111EHandsfreeAudioGateway: 0x111FAttribute NameAttribute IDNetwork0x0301SupportedFeatures0x0311 Hardcopy Replacement Profile Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:HCR_Print: 0x1126HCR_Scan: 0x1127Attribute NameAttribute ID1284ID0x0300Device Name0x0302Friendly Name0x0304Device Location0x0306 Headset Profile Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:Headset: 0x1108Headset - Audio Gateway (AG): 0x1112Headset: 0x1131Attribute NameAttribute IDRemote audio volume control0x0302 Health Device Profile Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:HDP Source: 0x1401HDP Sink: 0x1402Attribute NameAttribute IDSupportFeaturesList0x0200DataExchangeSpecification0x0301MCAP Supported Procedures0x0302 Human Interface Device Profile Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:HumanInterfaceDeviceService: 0x1124Attribute NameAttribute IDHIDDeviceReleaseNumber0x0200HIDParserVersion0x0201HIDDeviceSubclass0x0202HIDCountryCode0x0203HIDVirtualCable0x0204HIDReconnectInitiate0x0205HIDDescriptorList0x0206HIDLANGIDBaseList0x0207HIDSDPDisable0x0208HIDBatteryPower0x0209HIDRemoteWake0x020AHIDProfileVersion0x020BHIDSupervisionTimeout0x020CHIDNormallyConnectable0x020DHIDBootDevice0x020EReserved for HID Attributes0x020F-0x03FFAvailable for HID Language Strings0x0400-0xFFFF Interoperability Requirements for Bluetooth technology as a WAP Bearer [DEPRECATED] Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:WAP: 0x1113WAP_CLIENT: 0x1114Attribute NameAttribute IDNetworkAddress0x0306WAPGateway0x0307HomePageURL0x0308WAPStackType0x0309 Message Access Profile Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:Message Access Server: 0x1132Message Notification Server: 0x1133Attribute NameAttribute IDMASInstanceID0x0315SupportedMessageTypes0x0316 Object Push Profile Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:OBEXObjectPush: 0x1105Attribute NameAttribute IDGoepL2capPsm (OPP v1.2 and later)0x0200Service Version0x0300Supported Formats List0x0303 Personal Area Networking Profile Applicable to Service Class UUIDs:PANU: 0x1115NAP: 0x1116GN: 0x1117

https://qualweb.bluetooth.org/Technical/AssignedNumbers/service_discovery.htm

BLUETOOTH QUALCOM more

Bluetooth Wireless Technology Profiles

To use Bluetooth wireless technology, a device must be able to interpret certain Bluetooth profiles. Bluetooth profiles are definitions of possible applications and specify general behaviors that Bluetooth enabled devices use to communicate with other Bluetooth devices. There are a wide range of Bluetooth profiles that describe many different types of applications or use cases for devices. By following the guidance provided by the Bluetooth specification, developers can create applications to work with other Bluetooth devices.At a minimum, each Bluetooth profile contains information on the following topics:Dependencies on other profilesSuggested user interface formats.Specific parts of the Bluetooth protocol stack used by the profile. To perform its task, each profile uses particular options and parameters at each layer of the stack and this may include, if appropriate

https://qualweb.bluetooth.org/apps/content/default.aspx?doc_id=236409

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Serial Port Profile (SPP)

SPP defines how to set up virtual serial ports and connect two Bluetooth enabled devices.

Usage Scenarios

A scenario would be using two devices, such as PCs or laptops, as virtual serial ports and then connecting the two devices via Bluetooth technology.

Example Products

Here are a few examples of the types of devices that you might find using the SPP:PCLaptop

Getting Technical

The SPP defines two roles, Device A and Device B.Device A – This is the device that takes initiative to form a connection to another device (initiator).Device B – This is the device that waits for another device to take initiative to connect (acceptor).

he Baseband, LMP and L2CAP are the OSI layer 1 and 2 Bluetooth protocols. RFCOMM is the Bluetooth adaptation of GSM TS 07.10, providing a transport protocol for serial port emulation. SDP is the Bluetooth Service Discovery Protocol.The port emulation layer shown in the figure to the left is the entity emulating the serial port, or providing an API to applications.The applications on both sides are typically legacy applications, able and wanting to communicate over a serial cable (which in this case is emulated). But legacy applications cannot know about Bluetooth procedures for setting up emulated serial cables, which is why they need help from some sort of Bluetooth aware helper application on both sides. (These issues are not explicitly addressed in this profile; the major concern here is for Bluetooth interoperability.)

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Video Distribution Profile (VDP)

VDP defines how a Bluetoothenabled device streams video over Bluetooth wireless technology.

Usage Scenarios

Sample use cases include the streaming of a stored video from a PC media center to a portable player or streaming from a digital video camera to a TV.

Example Products

Here are a few examples of the types of devices that you might find using the VDP:PCPortable PlayerVideo CameraTVVideo monitor

Getting Technical

The VDP defines two roles, Source (SRC) and Sink (SNK).Source (SRC) – A device is the SRC when it acts as a source of a digital video stream that is delivered to the SNK of the piconet.Sink (SNK) – A device is the SNK when it acts as a sink of a digital video stream delivered from the SRC on the same piconet.The Baseband, LMP, L2CAP, SDP are Bluetooth protocols defined in the Bluetooth Core specifications. AVDTP consists of a signalling entity for negotiation of streaming parameters and a transport entity that can handle streaming itself.The Application layer shown in the figure to the left is the entity in which the device can set application service and transport service parameters. The entity also adapts the video streaming data into/from the defined packet format.For the shaded protocols/entities in the figure to the left, the GAVDP applies, except in those cases where this profile explicitly states deviations

https://qualweb.bluetooth.org/Building/HowTechnologyWorks/ProfilesAndProtocols/SPP.htm

https://qualweb.bluetooth.org/Building/HowTechnologyWorks/Architecture/HCI.htm

Host Controller Interface (HCI)

General Description

The HCI provides a command interface to the baseband controller and link manager, and access to configuration parameters. This interface provides a uniform method of accessing the Bluetooth baseband capabilities.

Lower Layers of the Bluetooth Software Stack

The figure to the left provides an overview of the lower software layers. The HCI firmware implements the HCI Commands for the Bluetooth hardware by accessing baseband commands, link manager commands, hardware status registers, control registers and event registers. Several layers may exist between the HCI driver on the host system and the HCI firmware in the Bluetooth hardware. These intermediate layers, the Host Controller Transport Layer, provide the ability to transfer data without intimate knowledge of the data.The HCI driver on the Host exchanges data and commands with the HCI firmware on the Bluetooth hardware. The Host Control Transport Layer (i.e. physical bus) driver provides both HCI layers with the ability to exchange information with each other. The Host will receive asynchronous notifications of HCI events independent of which Host Controller Transport Layer is used. HCI events are used for notifying the Host when something occurs. When the Host discovers that an event has occurred it will then parse the received event packet to determine which event occurred.

Host Controller Transport Layer

The host driver stack has a transport layer between the Host Controller driver and the Host. The main goal of this transport layer is transparency. The Host Controller driver (which interfaces to the Controller) should be independent of the underlying transport technology. Nor should the transport require any visibility into the data that the Host Controller driver passes to the Controller. This allows the interface (HCI) or the Controller to be upgraded without affecting the transport layer.

Host Controller Interface (HCI)

General Description

The HCI provides a command interface to the baseband controller and link manager, and access to configuration parameters. This interface provides a uniform method of accessing the Bluetooth baseband capabilities.

Lower Layers of the Bluetooth Software Stack

The figure to the left provides an overview of the lower software layers. The HCI firmware implements the HCI Commands for the Bluetooth hardware by accessing baseband commands, link manager commands, hardware status registers, control registers and event registers. Several layers may exist between the HCI driver on the host system and the HCI firmware in the Bluetooth hardware. These intermediate layers, the Host Controller Transport Layer, provide the ability to transfer data without intimate knowledge of the data.The HCI driver on the Host exchanges data and commands with the HCI firmware on the Bluetooth hardware. The Host Control Transport Layer (i.e. physical bus) driver provides both HCI layers with the ability to exchange information with each other. The Host will receive asynchronous notifications of HCI events independent of which Host Controller Transport Layer is used. HCI events are used for notifying the Host when something occurs. When the Host discovers that an event has occurred it will then parse the received event packet to determine which event occurred.

Host Controller Transport Layer

The host driver stack has a transport layer between the Host Controller driver and the Host. The main goal of this transport layer is transparency. The Host Controller driver (which interfaces to the Controller) should be independent of the underlying transport technology. Nor should the transport require any visibility into the data that the Host Controller driver passes to the Controller. This allows the interface (HCI) or the Controller to be upgraded without affecting the transport layer.

Overview of HCI Commands and Events

Generic Events

The generic events can occur due to multiple commands, or events that can occur at any time.

Device Setup

The device setup commands are used to place the Controller into a known state.

Controller Flow Control

The controller flow control commands and events are used to control data flow from the Host to the controller.

Controller Information

The controller information commands allow the Host to discover local information about the device.

Controller Configuration

The controller configuration commands and events allow the global configuration parameters to be configured.

Device Discovery

The device discovery commands and events allow a device to discover other devices in the surrounding area.

Connection Setup

The connection setup commands and events allow a device to make a connection to another device.

Remote Information

The remote information commands and events allow information about a remote device's configuration to be discovered.

Synchronous Connections

The synchronous connection commands and events allow synchronous connections to be created

Connection State

The connection state commands and events allow the configuration of a link, especially for low power operation.

Piconet Structure

The piconet structure commands and events allow the discovery and reconfiguration of piconet.

Quality of Service

The quality of service commands and events allow quality of service parameters to be specified.

Physical Links

The physical link commands and events allow the configuration of a physical link.

Host Flow Control

The Host flow control commands and events allow flow control to be used towards the Host.

Link Information

The link information commands and events allow information about a link to be read.

Authentication and Encryption

The authentication and encryption commands and events allow authentication of a remote device and then encryption of the link.

Testing

The testing commands and events allow a device to be placed into test mode.

HCI Flow Control

Host to Controller Data Flow Control

Flow control is used in the direction from the Host to the Controller to avoid overflowing the Controller data buffers with ACL data destined for a remote device (using a Connection Handle) that is not responding. The Host manages the data buffers of the Controller.

Controller to Host Data Flow Control

In some implementations, flow control may also be necessary in the direction from the Controller to the Host. The Set Host Controller To Host Flow Control command can be used to turn flow control on or off in that direction.

https://qualweb.bluetooth.org/Building/HowTechnologyWorks/Architecture/HCI.htm

PRESS RELEASES

November 15, 2012

Qualcomm Atheros and Cisco Announce Indoor Location Technology Collaboration

Network and Mobile Technology Leaders Team to Deliver More Precise Service Discovery and Context Awareness for Indoor EnvironmentsSAN JOSE, Calif. – November 15, 2012 — Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. (QTI) today announced that its networking and connectivity subsidiary, Qualcomm Atheros, Inc., and Cisco, the worldwide leader in networking, are collaborating to accelerate indoor location services for public and private venues that utilize Cisco wireless infrastructure, to provide an unprecedented set of benefits to venue owners, application developers, mobile device and networking OEMs, and consumers. The combination of the Qualcomm IZat™ indoor location services platform and the Cisco "Connected Mobile Experience" solution will improve indoor location accuracy and enable service discovery and context awareness in some of the world's leading retail, travel and hospitality venues. The leadership positions of the Cisco enterprise wireless solution and Qualcomm mobile technology will accelerate market adoption and foster further technology innovation to grow the indoor location ecosystem.Many connected consumers rely on their mobile devices and location-based apps for information, interaction and context. However, the majority of these apps and services are challenged in urban environments and indoors, where satellite systems are unable to provide location data. Together, Qualcomm Atheros and Cisco are focused on accelerating more precise indoor location capabilities and ensuring interoperability between their respective solutions in order to enhance service discovery, provide greater contextual awareness, and deliver a better experience in the world's leading venues."Qualcomm Atheros is enhancing the mobile experience by providing more precise context about who, and what, is nearby – in any environment," said Cormac Conroy, vice president, location products and technology, Qualcomm Atheros. "Working with Cisco to build an ecosystem of interoperable positioning technologies, we are creating new opportunities for mobile OEMs, operators and venues to roll out location-based services that deliver relevant and timely information to the customers they serve, whenever a smartphone based on the Qualcomm Snapdragon™ processor is near or within a Mobile Services Engine powered Wi-Fi network."Qualcomm Atheros' location technologies have shipped in more than one billion devices operating in mobile networks worldwide. The company recently enhanced its IZat location platform to enable more precise positioning (within 3-5 meters) inside buildings to make indoor positioning more useful to consumers. Overcoming the traditional challenges of indoor positioning brings Qualcomm Atheros, Cisco and the industry one step closer to their goal of providing always-on location awareness in any environment.Cisco Connected Mobile Experiences offers the first Wi-Fi Passpoint (HotSpot 2.0) solution to integrate indoor location and real-time analytic technologies to deliver personalized mobile services and content. The solution is built upon the Cisco Mobility Services Engine, the industry's only available technology that can leverage an existing access point infrastructure to determine indoor location for mobile devices. This solution enables app developers to leverage this contextual information to deploy mobile applications and services that engage the customer more effectively."We want to take the current popularity and reach of conventional outdoor navigation and location apps and extend it to indoor venues all over the world," said Sujai Hajela, vice president and general manager, wireless networking business unit, Cisco. "Combining the strengths of the leader in mobile-based positioning — Qualcomm Atheros — and our position as the leader in WLAN networking, creates new and exciting opportunities for our customers across industries such as retail, hospitality, entertainment, travel, healthcare and more. Together, we allow businesses to leverage the intelligence in their network and uncover additional revenue opportunities."Working together, Cisco and Qualcomm Atheros will differentiate the indoor location experience in venues where Cisco network infrastructure and Qualcomm-enabled handsets are being used, and accelerate indoor location capabilities on mobile devices in popular venues around the world. For more information, please visit www.qca.qualcomm.com and www.cisco.com.

About Cisco

Cisco (NASDAQ: CSCO) is the worldwide leader in networking that transforms how people connect, communicate and collaborate. Information about Cisco can be found at www.cisco.com. For ongoing news, please go to newsroom.cisco.com.

About Qualcomm Technologies, Inc.

Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. (QTI), a wholly owned subsidiary of Qualcomm Incorporated (NASDAQ: QCOM), is redefining the way people incorpo-rate wireless devices and services into everyday life. QTI and its subsidiaries operate substantially all of Qualcomm's research and development activities, and product and services businesses, including Qualcomm's semiconductor business, QCT. QTI's developments enable opportunities across the wireless and wired value chains by making devices and networks faster, content richer and communications more personal and affordable to people everywhere. For more information, go to www.qualcomm.com.

NOTE ON FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS:

Qualcomm Atheros is a trademark of Qualcomm Atheros Inc. Qualcomm, Snapdragon and IZat are trademarks of Qualcomm Incorporated. Wi-Fi is a registered trademark of the Wi-Fi Alliance. All other trademarks are the sole property of their respective owners.Cisco and the Cisco logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Cisco and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. A listing of Cisco's trademarks can be found at www.cisco.com/go/trademarks. Third-party trademarks mentioned are the property of their respective owners. The use of the word partner does not imply a partnership relationship between Cisco and any other company.

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BLUETOOTH HOST CONTROLER

https://qualweb.bluetooth.org/Building/HowTechnologyWorks/Architecture/HCI.htm

Host Controller Interface (HCI)

General Description

The HCI provides a command interface to the baseband controller and link manager, and access to configuration parameters. This interface provides a uniform method of accessing the Bluetooth baseband capabilities.

Lower Layers of the Bluetooth Software Stack

The figure to the left provides an overview of the lower software layers. The HCI firmware implements the HCI Commands for the Bluetooth hardware by accessing baseband commands, link manager commands, hardware status registers, control registers and event registers. Several layers may exist between the HCI driver on the host system and the HCI firmware in the Bluetooth hardware. These intermediate layers, the Host Controller Transport Layer, provide the ability to transfer data without intimate knowledge of the data.The HCI driver on the Host exchanges data and commands with the HCI firmware on the Bluetooth hardware. The Host Control Transport Layer (i.e. physical bus) driver provides both HCI layers with the ability to exchange information with each other. The Host will receive asynchronous notifications of HCI events independent of which Host Controller Transport Layer is used. HCI events are used for notifying the Host when something occurs. When the Host discovers that an event has occurred it will then parse the received event packet to determine which event occurred.

Host Controller Transport Layer

The host driver stack has a transport layer between the Host Controller driver and the Host. The main goal of this transport layer is transparency. The Host Controller driver (which interfaces to the Controller) should be independent of the underlying transport technology. Nor should the transport require any visibility into the data that the Host Controller driver passes to the Controller. This allows the interface (HCI) or the Controller to be upgraded without affecting the transport layer.

Overview of HCI Commands and Events

Generic Events

The generic events can occur due to multiple commands, or events that can occur at any time.

Device Setup

The device setup commands are used to place the Controller into a known state.

Controller Flow Control

The controller flow control commands and events are used to control data flow from the Host to the controller.

Controller Information

The controller information commands allow the Host to discover local information about the device.

Controller Configuration

The controller configuration commands and events allow the global configuration parameters to be configured.

Device Discovery

The device discovery commands and events allow a device to discover other devices in the surrounding area.

Connection Setup

The connection setup commands and events allow a device to make a connection to another device.

Remote Information

The remote information commands and events allow information about a remote device's configuration to be discovered.

Synchronous Connections

The synchronous connection commands and events allow synchronous connections to be created

Connection State

The connection state commands and events allow the configuration of a link, especially for low power operation.

Piconet Structure

The piconet structure commands and events allow the discovery and reconfiguration of piconet.

Quality of Service

The quality of service commands and events allow quality of service parameters to be specified.

Physical Links

The physical link commands and events allow the configuration of a physical link.

Host Flow Control

The Host flow control commands and events allow flow control to be used towards the Host.

Link Information

The link information commands and events allow information about a link to be read.

Authentication and Encryption

The authentication and encryption commands and events allow authentication of a remote device and then encryption of the link.

Testing

The testing commands and events allow a device to be placed into test mode.

HCI Flow Control

Host to Controller Data Flow Control

Flow control is used in the direction from the Host to the Controller to avoid overflowing the Controller data buffers with ACL data destined for a remote device (using a Connection Handle) that is not responding. The Host manages the data buffers of the Controller.

Controller to Host Data Flow Control

In some implementations, flow control may also be necessary in the direction from the Controller to the Host. The Set Host Controller To Host Flow Control command can be used to turn flow control on or off in that direction.

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---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Mail Delivery Subsystem
Date: Friday, February 1, 2013
Subject: Fuck you
To: 504trackmyhack504@gmail.com

Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently:

CAKiweZsJapgL1WsTJvWnBJB6xcVT4BUwoLqTLMXKJoanYwSqRg@mail.gmail.com

Technical details of permanent failure:
DNS Error: Domain name not found

----- Original message -----

DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
d=gmail.com; s=20120113;
h=mime-version:x-received:date:message-id:subject:from:to
:content-type;
bh=Lq5oQGF2A0o5MN8+OdWKAtk9BnGdJs3aoBW7o/MQCco=;
b=IIThD9kYDes8HHvDTdjvEQwPsR6tDkYJKp8zI4R/UW22zwD7S6b8xpZklrdEiSrcX7
g2EwLxOB1xkRjiSNgXi15KIu4GWIxz66Vf1dDT7gxhPCg2G4ZLGRnHzsYoZHIZCbdGat
V0xoJXaNHIOXQjj7EOczvWSqwQpdTSvrNKvmeGM7fr7ZXYWrhsrzod7S8vaQ0vRJc/Cu
pJTZvQ8/+MkplvaJNEKG6XDo2F+KQS1H/q3ByCvPq68PB+u/whS70kwpyhs89nUtltkk
h6G35gzoG1A3jIrYvrNjUZ8ntzMx1oJXqBnUPHzWIlKZ8M7ZDR+di4RH8TX6P7Fko1Gw
6uHQ==
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.60.31.19 with SMTP id w19mr11928338oeh.3.1359789897904; Fri,
01 Feb 2013 23:24:57 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.182.41.5 with HTTP; Fri, 1 Feb 2013 23:24:57 -0800 (PST)
Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2013 23:24:57 -0800
Message-ID: <CAKiweZuJaoBrDuNywyP1g4_j_HZNp62jvei_cMqJuQLfyTusJw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Fuck you
From: blogger <504trackmyhack504@gmail.com>
To: "CAKiweZsJapgL1WsTJvWnBJB6xcVT4BUwoLqTLMXKJoanYwSqRg@mail.gmail.com" <CAKiweZsJapgL1WsTJvWnBJB6xcVT4BUwoLqTLMXKJoanYwSqRg@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=e89a8fb1fd7ed5736704d4b8c13b

CAKiweZsJapgL1WsTJvWnBJB6xcVT4BUwoLqTLMXKJoanYwSqRg@mail.gmail.com

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QRG-12 Call Sequencers

Allow Multiple Attendants to Answer Sequenced Calls while Eliminating Call Crashing The SQRG-12 Sequential Ring Generator is designed for applications where more than one person answers incoming calls and those persons may be in locations where the TMS-6X or TMS-12A is not visible. The SQRG-12 eliminates confusion about which line to answer next by displaying the oldest call as a ringing line on all phones in the phone system.

OverviewSpecificationsApplicationsDocuments

Ground To Loop Start GLS-12

GLS-12 is designed to allow up to 12 standard telephone sets, multi-line key systems or other loop start equipment to be connected to and operate on two-wire ground start CO trunk lines. The GLS-12 provides the CO ground start line with the signalling required to draw dial tone when the loop start equipment goes off-hook. Incoming calls are not affected by the GLS-12 and ring directly to the loop start devices

Viking GLS-12 Ground To Loop Start Converter:

GLS-12 - Viking GLS-12 12 Circuit Ground to Loop Start Convertergds

Viking GLS-12 Ground

Allows PABX and key systems configured for loop start trunks, as well as standard tele phones to be connected to C.O. ground start trunksEliminates wiring ground start buttons in standard telephones



Viking RAD-1A Line Powered Remote Access Device:

RAD-1A - Viking RAD1A Line Powered Remote Access Device

OverviewSpecificationsApplicationsDocuments

RAD-1A Amplified

Line Powered Remote Access DeviceThe RAD-1A, remote access device, gives authorized users remote access to one way paging amplifiers, digital announcers and other audio programs. A programmable access code prohibits access by unauthorized users. The RAD-1A answers on the first ring and disconnects on CPC, call time out, silence time out, busy or by dialing #7. Separate 600 ohm audio and telephone line outputs are provided, allowing connection to audio amplifiers, digital announcers, or phone systems. The user does not have to hang up and redial the RAD-1A to access other features.

      SKU :    RAD-AMP    Category

Viking/Remote Access|Long Loop Adapter

Item

Viking RAD-AMP Amplified Remote Access Device

New:$ 285.00Options Quantity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

Viking RAD-AMP Amplified Remote Access Device:

RAD-AMP - Viking RADAMP Amplified Remote Access Device

OverviewSpecificationsApplicationsDocuments

RAD-AMP Amplified

Extend Your Phone System s Features and Forward Calls to Telecommuters The RAD-AMP extends the usefulness of your phone system to remote employees, as well as providing call forwarding to remote employees or locations. As a line extender, the RAD-AMP provides authorized users remote access to PABX, Centrex or Electronic Key system features. As a call diverter, the RAD-AMP provides call forwarding from one location to another. After detecting an inbound call, the RAD-AMP accesses a second phone line, dials a preprogrammed Touch Tone number, and then bridges the two lines. As a Telecommuting extender, the RAD-AMP gives remote workers access to most PABX/KSU features from their home or cell phone. The home based employee hears a special tone when answering and has the option of taking the work related call. Remote call center personnel can "Log-In" and Log-Out" or change their forwarding number as their location changes. Using Touch Tones, remote workers can use phone system features to transfer the call to another extension or voice mail, start a conference call, generate a page or any other feature available to an analog PABX/KSU extension. For "Data" applications, the RAD-1 is required

eaturesPhone line poweredNon-volatile E 2 memoryCompatible with Touch Tone or rotary phones.5 to 49.5 minute call timer with disconnectProgrammable allow or restrict table stores up to forty 12-digit phone numbers, prefixes or area codes6 digit bypass code for single call overrideProgrammable to ignore phone system line access numbersProgrammable ignore table stores up to twelve 12-digit phone numbers, ideal for *67, *69, etc.Programmable maximum digit string lengthConcealed in a standard RJ11C jackAllow or restrict 1-800 numbersOperational alert tonesAllows emergency and toll free numbersMade in the USASpecificationsPower: Phone line powered (24V DC w/20mA minimum)Dimensions: 70mm x 57mm x 22mm (2.75" x 2.25" x .88")Environmental: 0 C to 32 C (32 F to 90 F) with 5% to 95% non-condensing humidityConnections: (1) RJ11 jack, (2) screw terminalsPart Number: TR
SO-24A Service Observation Unit

Add Silent Observation to Most Phone Systems The SO-24A allows supervisors to silently monitor employee phones without disrupting the activity at their workstation. The information gathered may be used for quality purposes, to train, motivate even assist customer service and telemarketing representatives. A supervisor may enter the conversation by dialing a "*." A cassette recorder output permits automatic or manual recording of conversations.The SO-24A features improved audio and can now be easily expanded to 240 stations by installing additional 24 line units. The SO-24A can be programmed with a 2, 3 or 4 digit dial up code to match station extension numbers.

http://www.vikingproductstore.com/viking/system-5-Site-Map.html

Friday, February 1, 2013

Files created and wifi share password

Note_2222

1359782148845

1359782077925

REGISTRY ICE

http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa369206(v=vs.85).aspx

An ICE is used to validate installation packages. The table in this topic identifies each ICE. For information about ICEMs used to validate merge modules, see Merge Module ICE Reference.ICEDescriptionICE01Simple test of ICE mechanism.ICE02Circular reference test for File-Component, Registry-Component KeyPaths.ICE03Basic data and foreign key validation.ICE04Validates file sequence numbers against the LastSequence numbers of the Media Table.ICE05Validates for "required" entries in particular tables.ICE06Validates for missing column or tables in the database. Any column defined in the _Validation table must be found in the database.ICE07Validates that fonts are installed to the FontsFolder.ICE08Checks for duplicate GUIDs in the ComponentId column of the Component table.ICE09Validates that the permanent bit is set for every component marked for installation into the SystemFolder.ICE10Ensures that advertise feature states among children and parents are compatible.ICE12Validates type 35 and type 51 custom actions and their locations in the sequence tables.ICE13Validates that dialogs are not listed as actions in the execute sequence tables. Dialog actions are only allowed in the user interface sequence tables.ICE14Validates that feature parents do not have the msidbFeatureAttributesFollowParent bit set. Also validates that the entries in the Feature and Feature_Parent columns are not the same in the same record.ICE15Validates that a circular reference exists between every entry in the MIME table and the corresponding extension in the Extension table.ICE16Validates that the ProductName in the Property table is not greater than 63 characters in length.ICE17Validates control type dependencies in the Control table. Covers PushButtons, RadioButtonGroups, ListBoxes, ListViews, and ComboBoxes.ICE18Validates the KeyPath column of the Component table when it is null. In this case, the key path is a Directory.ICE19Validates the advertising tables: Class, TypeLib, Extension, PublishComponents, and Shortcut.ICE20Validates that the required dialogs are in the Dialog table.ICE21Validates that all components in the Component table map to a feature in the FeatureComponents table.ICE22Validates that the Feature_ and Component_ columns in the PublishComponent table.ICE23Validates the tab order of controls in all dialog boxes.ICE24Validates certain properties in the Property table.ICE25Verifies merge module dependencies and merge module exclusions.ICE26Validates required and prohibited actions in the sequence tables.ICE27Validates the organization and order of the sequence tables.ICE28Validates actions that must not be separated by ForceReboot.ICE29Validates that your stream names remain unique if truncated to the 62-character limit.ICE30Validates that the installation of components containing the same file never install the file more than one time in the same directory.ICE31Validates the text styles listed in the Text column of the control table.ICE32Compares the column definitions to validate that keys and foreign keys are of the same size and type.ICE33Checks the registry table for entries that belong in other tables.ICE34Validates that every group of radio buttons has a default.ICE35Validates that any files from a cabinet file cannot be set to run from the source.ICE36Validates that icons listed in the Icon table are used in the Class, ProgID, or Shortcut tables.ICE38Validates that components installed under the user's profile use a registry key under HKCU as their key path.ICE39Validates the Summary Information stream of the database.ICE40Performs various miscellaneous checks.ICE41Validates that entries in the Extension and Class tables refer to components belonging to the referenced feature.ICE42Checks that Class table entries do not have .exe files set as InProc values, and that only LocalServer contexts have arguments and DefInProc values.ICE43Checks that non-advertised shortcuts are in components with HKCU registry keys as the key paths.ICE44Checks that dialog events in the ControlEvent table (NewDialog, SpawnDialog, SpawnWaitDialog) reference valid Dialogs in the Dialog table.ICE45Checks for reserved bits that are set.ICE46Checks for custom properties that only differ from defined properties by their case.ICE47Checks for features with more than 1600 components per feature..ICE48Checks for directories that are hard-coded to local paths.ICE49Checks for non-REG_SZ default values in the registry table.ICE50Checks that advertised shortcuts have correct icons and context menus.ICE51Checks that TTC/TTF fonts do not have titles, but that all other fonts do.ICE52Checks for non-public properties in the AppSearch table.ICE53Checks for registry entries that write private installer information or policy values.ICE54Checks for components using companion files as their key path file.ICE55Checks that LockPermission objects exist and have valid permissions.ICE56Validates that the directory structure of the .msi file has a single valid root.ICE57Validates that individual components do not mix per-machine and per-user data.ICE58Checks that your Media Table does not have more than 80 rows.ICE59Checks that advertised shortcuts belong to components that are installed by the target feature of the shortcut.ICE60Checks that if a file in the File Table is not a font and has a version, then it also has a language.ICE61Checks the Upgrade Table.ICE62Performs extensive checks on the IsolatedComponent Table for data that may cause unexpected behavior.ICE63Checks for proper sequencing of the RemoveExistingProducts action.ICE64Checks that new directories in the user profile are removed in roaming scenarios.ICE65Checks that the Environment Table does not have invalid prefix or append values.ICE66Uses the tables in the database to determine which schema your database should use.ICE67Checks that the target of a non-advertised shortcut belongs to the same component as the shortcut itself, or that the attributes of the target component ensure that it does not change installation locations.ICE68Checks that all custom action types needed for an installation are valid.ICE69Checks that all substrings of the form [$componentkey] within a Formatted string do not cross-reference components.ICE70Verifies that integer values for registry entries are specified correctly.ICE71Verifies that the Media Table contains an entry with DiskId equal to 1.ICE72Ensures that the only custom actions used in the AdvtExecuteSequence Table are type 19, type 35, and type 51 custom actions.ICE73Verifies that your package does not reuse package codes or product codes of the Windows Installer SDK samples. For more information, see Package Codes and Product Codes.ICE74Verifies that the FASTOEM property has not been authored into the Property Table.ICE75Verifies that all custom action types that use an installed file as their source are sequenced after theCostFinalize Action.ICE76Verifies that no files in the BindImage Table reference SFP (WFP) catalogs.ICE77Verifies that in-script custom actions are sequenced after the InstallInitialize Action and before theInstallFinalize Action.ICE78Verifies that the AdvtUISequence Table either does not exist or is empty.ICE79Validates references to components and features entered in the database fields using the Condition data type.ICE80Validates that Template Summary Property and Page Count Summary Property correctly specify the presence of 64-bit components or custom action scripts.ICE81Validates the MsiDigitalCertificate Table, MsiDigitalSignature Table and MsiPackageCertificate Table.ICE82Validates the InstallExecuteSequence Table.ICE83Validates the MsiAssembly Table.ICE84Checks the sequence tables to verify that required Standard Actions are not set with conditions.ICE85Validates that the SourceName column of the MoveFile Table is a valid long file name.ICE86Issues a warning if the package uses the AdminUser property in database column of the Condition type.ICE87Validates that the following properties have not been authored in the Property Table.ICE88Validates the DirProperty column of IniFile Table.ICE89Validates that the value in the Progid_Parent column in ProgId Table is a valid foreign key into the ProgId column in ProgId table.ICE90Posts a warning if it finds that a shortcut's directory has been specified as a public property.ICE91Posts a warning if a file, .ini file, or shortcut file is installed into a per-user profile directory that does not vary based on the ALLUSERS property.ICE92Verifies that a component without a Component Id GUID is not also specified as a permanent component. Verifies that no component has both the msidbComponentAttributesPermanent and msidbComponentAttributesUninstallOnSupersedence attributes.ICE93Issues a warning if a custom action uses the same name as a standard action.ICE94Issues a warning if there are any unadvertised shortcuts pointing to an assembly file in the global assembly cache.ICE95Checks the Control Table and BBControl Table to verify that the billboard controls fit onto all the billboards.ICE96Verifies that the PublishFeatures Action and the PublishProduct Action are entered in theAdvtExecuteSequence Table.ICE97Verifies that two components do not isolate a shared component to the same directory.ICE98Verifies the description field of the ODBCDataSource Table for an ODBC data source.ICE99Verifies that no property name entered in the Directory table duplicates a name reserved for the public or private use of the Windows Installer.ICE100Checks the authoring of the MsiEmbeddedUI and MsiEmbeddedChainer tables.ICE101Checks that no value in the Feature column of the Feature table exceeds a maximum length of 38 characters.ICE102Validates the MsiServiceConfig and MsiServiceConfigFailureActions tables.ICE103Validates the MsiPrint and MsiLaunchApp control events.ICE104Verifies the MsiLockPermissionsEx and LockPermissions tables.ICE105Validates that the package has been authored to be installed in a per-user context.

FORENSIC.ASSISTANCE REFERALS

http://www.guidancesoftware.com/

http://miatforensics.org/

https://viaforensics.com/press-releases/viaforensics-announces-release-android-forensics-application.html

http://www.asset-intertech.com/Products/Boundary-Scan-Test/e-Book-JTAG-Tutorial
http://www.porcupine.org/forensics/tct.html
http://sfdumper.sourceforge.net/
http://www.caine-live.net/
http://www.sleuthkit.org/